The framework that ended Lebanon’s war in 2006 could help end this one too, says Tarek Mitri

FOR ISRAEL, Lebanon is once again a killing field. Air strikes and now an ever-growing ground incursion have exacted an enormous price from Lebanese civilians. But to see Israel’s stated goal of the complete destruction of Hizbullah as a way toward peace is misguided, because it views Hizbullah through too narrow a lens. Instead there is hope, conditional on American pressure, for a durable ceasefire drawing on the plan that put an end to the war with Israel in 2006 and embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

A conservative government estimate suggests that in the current conflict 1.2m Lebanese people—nearly a quarter of the population—have been displaced. As targeted air strikes decimated military and political leaders of Hizbullah, more than 2,000 have been killed and 10,000 injured. Never in any war in Lebanon have military operations killed so many rescue workers, firefighters and paramedics. In southern Lebanon several villages have been emptied and flattened. As in Gaza, the Israeli army has proved its disregard for international humanitarian law, specifically the notions of proportionality and distinction between combatants and civilians.

What, at this stage, remains of Hizbullah and its capabilities? Its leadership is probably disorientated and facing debilitating communication and co-ordination problems. But it is not just a military organisation, and thus in any event it will not disappear. It has been a grave mistake for Israel and other enemies of Hizbullah to cast it as merely a part of Iran’s surrogate network. In addition to its military structure, it is a strong Lebanese party with a highly influential political representation. It runs a constellation of civil and community efforts, such as a large web of educational and health institutions. Its considerable popular following—crucially, not only among the country’s Shia Muslims—is undeniable.

Many Lebanese therefore do not think that the defeat of Hizbullah is necessarily a gain for them. To be clear, plenty of people, perhaps a majority, disputed the group’s decision to risk dragging Lebanon into all-out war. They now blame it for drawing Israel’s fury. Nevertheless, most Lebanese do not see the Israelis as their liberators.

The rhyming of history matters here. An Israeli invasion in 1982 aimed at Palestinian militants led to war and an 18-year occupation in the country’s south, and the creation of a buffer zone in the border area. This occupation was the crucible in which Hizbullah was formed: militants mostly from southern towns and villages fought relentlessly, achieving a total Israeli withdrawal in 2000.

No less a rhyme is the war in 2006. Israel’s objective, then as now, was to degrade Hizbullah’s capabilities. But the wider destruction was severe. Fierce resistance, Lebanese diplomatic efforts and the belated displeasure of America helped prevent even more devastation. What formally ended the war was Resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities and Israeli withdrawal; for respect of the “Blue Line”, a provisional border; and for UN troops, alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces, to deploy south of the Litani river, about 30km north of the border.

For 17 years, the resolution was largely respected. Although Hizbullah did not pull out of the area south of the Litani, its presence was not visible, and the cessation of hostilities was not significantly violated. That changed in October last year, and I believe that today the implementation of Resolution 1701 by all parties is a necessary condition—but perhaps not a sufficient one—for a durable ceasefire.

Peace in southern Lebanon is inseparable from the restoration of Lebanon’s state sovereignty over its territory. It will require the establishment of an area between the Blue Line and the Litani river, free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese government. The UN force must be enhanced and affirm its authority to “take all necessary action” where it is deployed. Most importantly, the national army must play a more robust role in exerting the authority of the Lebanese government. That will require considerable international support to the Lebanese Armed Forces—beyond limited American assistance, which is often vulnerable to American domestic politics and Israeli wishes.

Israel’s declared military objectives may, as they were in Gaza, be revised on the ground, foreshadowing an absolute war of annihilation. However, a total defeat of Hizbullah, like a total victory over Hamas, will remain elusive; for now, there are no clear political objectives in sight. Even if many Lebanese have not supported Hizbullah and its military activity against Israel, they are almost unanimously appalled by the collective punishment imposed on them. They are united in their call for an end to this war.

The Israeli illusion of building a new Lebanon and reshaping the Middle East, exemplified by many declarations of officials and opposition figures, sparks memories. It evokes the deceit that became apparent after the war on Iraq in 2003, and the talk, during the 2006 war in Lebanon, of the “birth pangs of a new Middle East”. But since that time, we have seen nothing but more violence, more desolation, more anarchy. It is time for a ceasefire and diplomacy, and ultimately for securing the strict implementation of the international resolution already on the table—for the good of not just Lebanon.

Tarek Mitri was a foreign minister of Lebanon in 2006 and held several ministerial posts between 2005 and 2011. He is the president of St George University of Beirut.

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